Light Rail Jacksonville

Is this what we want Downtown Jacksonville to look like 20 years from now? Can you imagine the urban scene if would be if this was a Modern Streetcar running through a meadow of grass and flowers?

Five Golden Questions:

- Why does your bus system cost more per mile than commuter rail systems
currently under construction in [example cities]?

Myth:

"Bus Rapid Transit" ("BRT") is much cheaper than light rail transit (LRT).

Reality:

Transportation engineer Edson L. Tennyson, PE (a technical consultant to the Light Rail Now Project) has analyzed this issue extensively, and contends that the "cost savings" of high-quality, equivalently routed "BRT" – compared with LRT – are largely imaginary.
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*Central Florida Commuter Rail: 61 miles for $615 million = $10.1 million per mile

JTA Bus Rapid Transit: 29 miles for $750 million = $25.9 million per mile

**San Diego Sprinter DMU: 22 miles for $440 million = $20 million per mile

* - Orlando's commuter rail project is being jointly funded locally by all four counties that it serves.

**- The Sprinter DMU costs so much because they are tearing up the existing freight rail, raising the entire corridor's grade and then laying new track.  When complete, DMU cars will use the line during the day and freight traffic will run at night.


DENVER-PORTLAND-SALT LAKE CITY-ST.LOUIS
Ed notes that Denver's C and D LRT lines, Portland's MAX LRT to the PDX Airport, Salt Lake City's Trax LRT to Sandy, and St. Louis the MetroLink LRT extension from East St.Louis to Scott Air Force Base – a total of about 45 miles of LRT in all – cost approximately $23 million a mile "including cars and some shops". Phoenix's new LRT, presently under construction almost entirely in the street, "is costing more than twice that with five years of inflation (15% total) and much street reconfiguration." Ed assigns LRT a rate of 3.0 percent depreciation, "so the annual cost of $23 million is $700,000."

PITTSBURGH
In contrast, Ed points out, Pittsburgh's West Busway, built at generally the same time as the above LRT lines, cost approximately $50 millon per mile without the cost of buses included – although it had a tunnel rehab involved. However, the busway also benefited from a pre-graded right-of-way from a former railroad. No buses or garages were included in the cost.

LOS ANGELES
The Harbor Freeway Transitway (busway) in Los Angeles also cost approximately $50 million per mile, with less pavement cost for HOV construction but higher station costs in the freeway. Ed figures that, with shorter bus and pavement life, the depreciation rate is 5% – so the annual cost, with the cost of buses included, is $3.5 million per mile ... "far in excess of LRT cost. " In fact, Ed emphasizes, "Five times as much."

While LA's "Orange Line" busway cost only about $14 million per mile, plus the cost of buses and their facilities, Ed contends that "that low cost is not honest." He points out that the right-of-way was previously acquired for LRT (but political problems stemming from local community opposition resulted in legislation prohibiting the installation of a surface LRT line in the corridor).

Ed adds 25 percent to the project cost for the right-of-way, and adds in the cost of the buses, bringing the annual depreciation to about $1.4 million per mile, "double LRT cost."

Heritage Trolleys and Monorails:

Kenosha's "expensive heritage trolley... OH REALLY??"
Cost per... Bus Streetcar D-R
Passenger-trip $3.23 $4.56 $7.92
Passenger-mile $0.87 $4.04 $1.76

While costs of over $4.50 per passenger-mile and over $4.00 per passenger-boarding are inordinately high for typical LRT, they may not be quite so egregious for a short, slow, central-area shuttle or circulator service. Would a rubber-tired faux-"trolley" minibus really have dramatically different costs – and still offer the same attraction for the public, and interest for adjacent businesses and developers?

It's worth noting that the O&M cost per passenger-mile of Kenosha's streetcar circulator service is actually not out of the range of other major short-distance central-city circulation-distribution rail or "fixed-guideway" transit systems, and in fact is less costly than some, in far more transit-favorable conditions. These systems use a variety of modes, including streetcar, automated guideway transit (AGT), and monorail (automated and manual). The following table provides comparative per-passenger-mile cost data for a number of such systems (FTA, NTDB, 2003):

City Urbanized Area Population Mode Cost per Passenger-Mile
Memphis......... 972,100 .....Streetcar............. $2.26
Tampa............ 2,062,300.. Streetcar............. $2.19
Seattle............ 2.712,200 ..Streetcar............. $3.47
Detroit............ 3,903,400.. Rail AGT............. $6.75
Miami .............4,919,000.. AGT..................... $3.02
Seattle ............2.712,200 ..Monorail...... .......$1.10
Jacksonville... 882,300 .....Monorail.. AGT... $17.85

*AGT = Automated Guideway Transit (People Mover) 

-Do you think our "Downtown Trolley - Bus shuttles are as attractive and benefit us as much as a real streetcar would?

MYTH:

Buses are cheaper then Light Rail and do just as good or better in operations:

FACT:

Buses must be replaced every 12 years (industry experts say 8 is more realistic) while streetcars according to the FTA last at least 35 years, though many are as much as 60 years old and still going strong. Further, pavement must be resurfaced every few years with bus traffic, more so with the new heavy hybrids, which outweigh many streetcars, while the FTA assigns a 60 to 100 year life to streetcar track. Ridership also pales:

Real Streetcars Outdraw Fakes

BY: Ed Strauss
Riders eagerly pay a dollar to ride Tucson's historic streetcar line while a rubber-tired "trolley bus" with a 25-cent fare gets half the ridership.

   Car 255 cost OPT $820 to buy but $27,000 to ship from Osaka, Japan.
 
 Starting on April 17, 1993, Tucson unwittingly began a test of whether riders prefer genuine streetcars or rubber-tired ersatz trolleys. So far the electric choice seems to be well ahead. During May, the first full month of operation, three times as many riders paid four times as much to ride half as far in the newly restored rail line than they would have paid to ride m a modern “trolley” bus.

A ride on the historic line costs one dollar while the SunTran shuttle bus fare is twenty-five cents. The trolley line is only one mile in length while the bus route is about two miles and connects more activity centers including downtown Tucson and the convention center. Further discouraging riders, the streetcar only runs three days a week while the bus runs six days.

Although the streetcar duplicates the university end of the bus route, operating hours are such that Saturday daytime is the only period during the week that the two modes directly compete. Current streetcar hours are Friday, 6 P.M. to midnight; Saturday, 10A.M. to midnight; and Sunday, noon to 6 P.M. The dressed-up buses operate Monday through Saturday, daytime only.

- Why is your bus system designed to compete against existing transportation investments (the skyway) instead of compliment it? OR When your busway competes with Trolleys or Skyway, what will happen?

Myth:

People will prefer to just stay on the bus rather then transfer to a Streetcar, Skyway or Train.

Fact:

In almost ever major urban center, people transfer from mode to mode without a care. Even in the movies, how many times has the subject gone from cab to bus to subway? This is as much a part of linked, connected mass transit, as turning from a highway onto a neighborhood street. The fact remains, when given a choice of bus or rail side by side, the bus loses badly. Transfers should not only be a part of any good system, they should be seamless between modes. One of the drawbacks to our own "Skyway" is it's elevated location isn't where the people are. Skyway, monorail, train, bus, BRT, LRT or any combination of the above, should be simple across the platform transfers where ever possible.  Monorails can go down and buses and trains can go up, there is simply no reason why this can't be effected.

• Los Angeles, 1997-2000 – The Harbor Transitway, with busway stations, cost approximately $500 million for ten miles of route. A project of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA), the busway was originally projected to attract 63,000 weekday rider-trips, in actuality, the service has attracted only about 5,000. 

LA's Harbor Transitway "BRT" service parallels Blue Line LRT in similar corridor, providing fast bus service with much shorter peak-period headways. Ridership averages around 5,000 a day.

What is particularly striking about the Harbor Transitway "BRT" service, however, is that it approximately parallels LACMTA's Blue Line LRT service, several miles to the east, and in a roughly comparable corridor. Yet the Blue Line has exhibited far superior ridership attraction. By 1995 – roughly the same length of time that the Harbor Transitway has been in operation – ridership had reached 40,000 per day ... about 8 times the ridership level of the Harbor Transitway "BRT" service. And that's with peak-period headways (i.e., passenger waiting times) on the Blue Line LRT that are 6.5 minutes compared to the 4-minute headways on the Harbor Transitway "BRT" – i.e., over 50% higher!

Even allowing for the difference in route length (the Blue Line, at 22 miles, is about twice as long), LRT has still outperformed the Harbor Transitway "BRT" in ridership by a factor of four. Today the Blue Line's ridership has exceeded 80,000 per day.

In terms of cost-effectiveness, the Harbor Transitway "BRT" has been distinctly unsuccessful. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and political leaders have endeavored to bolster ridership by reducing the "BRT" fare by half and adding service, but to date there has been no clear improvement. [7, 9, LRN analysis]

Which photo is more appealing to you? Modern Transit Bus above, or 1920 vintage Interurban below? Note that both photos are taken of the Driver or Motorman respectively. Which experience would you pull off the freeway and share with your children?

What are the Benefits of BRT over Commuter Rail or Light Rail? All smoke and mirrors!
Myth:

With all things equal, the bus can do the same job, and attract the same riders at a fraction of the cost.

Fact:

Certainly, some Quality Bus (or "BRT") services – and even regular, local services in some high-volume corridors – attract substantial ridership. Even before initiation of the MetroRapid "BRT", for example, Los Angeles's Wilshire transit bus corridor routinely experienced daily flows of more than 50,000 rider-trips per weekday. However, while the reasons are not entirely clear, there is abundant evidence that, for equivalent routes and services, rail transit typically tends to attract significantly higher ridership than does bus service – including Quality Bus or "BRT".

In a study titled "Impact on Transit Patronage of Cessation or Inauguration of Rail Service", for example, published by the Transportation Research Board in 1989 (Transportation Research Record 1221) [6], Edson L. Tennyson, PE, concludes that, when service conditions are equal,

it is evident that rail transit is likely to attract from 34 percent to 43 percent more riders than will equivalent bus service. The data do not provide explanations for this phenomenon, but other studies and reports suggest that the clearly identifiable rail route; delineated stops that are often protected; more stable, safer, and more comfortable vehicles; freedom from fumes and excessive noise; and more generous vehicle dimensions may all be factors.

In a subsequent analysis of recent LRT and busway installations, Tennyson concludes that, for new starts installed in corridors serving the core areas of American cities, "BRT" busways have attracted only one-third of the rider-trips estimated for them by modeling approved by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). In contrast, new LRT operations have attracted 122 percent of their projected ridership. [2] (See "BRT" - You Can Build It ... But Will They Come? [7])

Survey evidence of public's rail preference
Further corroboration of such research – and evidence of widespread public preference for rail public transport – are provided by the results of occasional public surveys. For example, as our article American Public Says: Let's Have More Rail! reports, when asked which modes they would like to see "have an increasing share of passenger transportation", 44% of respondents to a recent Harris poll selected "commuter" trains (apparently referring to both local and regional rail transit). That was nearly double the 23% that opted for "Local bus service". In Jacksonville something around 5% of all citizens use our bus system. What would be magic about building another freeway for the same vehicles? Why would I want to ride any more over that road then the one they use today? Surveys also show, most passengers are less concerned with speed then they are on-time performance. On time bus operations is an unknown concept to the citizens of Jacksonville.

In another example, a 2001 United Kingdom survey, as summarized in Tramways & Urban Transit of June 2001, revealed that "motorists put light rail top of the list of preferred transport alternatives...." (See Motorists prefer light rail over buses, reports UK poll) The research results, contained in a UK government-sponsored document, Transport Choices of Car Users in Rural and Urban Areas, were based on a survey of households located in the Manchester, Bedford, Hull, and north Suffolk areas.

"Of the public transport options appraised in the survey, light rail was regarded as an acceptable and convenient alternative to the car and generally considered to be frequent, quick, clean and safe" explained the survey report. In contrast to the light rail results, according to the T&UT summary, "buses were perceived as falling substantially short of meeting people's needs", and buses "were seen as undesirable and low status...."

Such statistical conclusions and survey results are reflected in the fact that, on most new LRT systems, parking lots are jammed, and riders are pouring onto trains; while, in contrast, typical new "BRT" systems may experience modest increases in ridership, but certainly not the avalanche of passengers seen on LRT.

Reality lessons from actual operating results
There is a plethora of real-world evidence underpinning the research data. Unfortunately, it's mostly "anecdotal" – because conducting controlled scientific experiments of two different transit modes offering the same basic service in the same corridor is virtually impossible. But consistently repeated examples of transit mode performance can suggest patterns helpful in planning analysis and decisionmaking.

The following examples provide some case studies of both rail transit and busway-type "BRT" operations which tend to suggest that, with similar service levels in the same or similar corridors, such "BRT" services have not attracted the same level of ridership as rail operations. These cases, and the evidence cited above, suggest that the potential of LRT and other rail alternatives to attract ridership in corridors specifically targeted for major transit investments may be greater than planners assume and than somewhat mechanistic forecasting models (constrained by strict Federal Transit Administration guidelines) predict.

• Suburban Philadelphia, 1967 – The conversion of the Ardmore electric rail trolley (legacy LRT) line to a busway resulted in an almost immediate 15 percent loss of ridership; furthermore, an increase in operations and maintenance (O&M) costs (due to the need for more buses to maintain schedules, despite sinking ridership) provoked a downward spiral in service and ridership to a point where the line today carries only a few hundred daily rider-trips. [7]

• Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC, 1970-1996 – The Shirley Busway was deemed a great success upon its opening in 1970. The pre-existing Route 18 was expanded from three trips per day (without subsidy) to approximately thirty trips with subsidy – yielding a substantial increase in ridership.
However, with long gaps between buses, political pressure grew to convert the busway into an HOV lane, opening it up for use by automobiles and other private motor vehicles. Ridership peaked in 1980-81 during the second energy crisis. Subsequently it declined 67% as costs increased sharply. At the same time, transit ridership in the National Capital area ballooned from 135 million per year to 270 million, mainly because of the introduction of the MetroRail system. In 1996, ridership on the Route 18 Shirley Busway buses had plunged to 2,350 weekday rider-trips.

As MetroRail service was introduced to the Route 18 territory (Springfield, Virginia), bus ridership dropped further to 1,650 per day; however, MetroRail patronage in Springfield soared to 13,000, even though bus fares were lower than rail and travel time was approximately equal. Furthermore, the operating cost of rail transit was far less per passenger. [7]

• South Pittsburgh, 1978 – The South Busway, projected to carry 35,000 weekday rider-trips, actually attracted only 20,000 rider-trips initially, and that level has now dropped to about 14,500, less than pre-busway ridership in the affected corridor. Meanwhile, a parallel LRT upgrade has attracted approximately fifty percent more passengers. [7]

• East Pittsburgh, 1983 - The East Busway was originally projected to attract 80,000 weekday rider-trips, but the actual service initially attracted only about 30,000. The system actually lost 25 percent of bus riders as the busways were further developed. [7]

• Pittsburgh, 1999-2000 – The West Busway, with a capital cost of approximately $55 million per mile, was originally projected to attract 50,000 weekday rider-trips. However, initial ridership of only 5,400 has grown modestly to about 9,500 (19% of original projections); in part, this may be temporary, as repairs to a parallel bridge in the corridor initially delayed motor vehicle traffic and have given a temporary ostensible advantage to the busway. [7, 8]
Taken as a whole, Pittsburgh's three busways were forecast to attract a total of approximately 165,000 weekday rider-trips. In reality, only 55,000 daily rider-trips have actually materialized some 25 years from the opening of the region's first busway. [7, 8] In recent years, transit development seems to have shifted more heavily into expansion of Pittsburgh's LRT system.

Is this what we want downtown Jacksonville to look like 20 years from now? Can you imagine the urban scene this would be if it were a freeway full of diesel buses?